Dutch neo-conservative revolution:
the Edmund Burke Foundation
Version August 21th, 2007
Maria Trepp m.trepp@wanadoo.nl
See also: www.passagenproject.com/english.html
This is a summary of (the original) Dutch text as well
as a lay-out for my future research. This is work in progress, this
text is not complete and is not continuous yet!
For a better readability download www.passagenproject.com/neoconservatism.rtf
For Dutch original quotes and documentation see www.passagenproject.com/conservatisme.html
1.1.The Burke Foundation: history
1.3. Neoconservatives at Leiden
University
1.3.2.
Andreas Kinneging, professor of Philosophy of Law at Leiden University
1.3.3.
Afshin Ellian, professor of Social Coherence at Leiden University
1.3.4.
Paul Cliteur, Professor of the Philosophy of Law at Leiden University
1.3.5. A
young neo-conservative ideologist at the Leiden German institution: Jerker
Spits
1.3.6. Burke director and secretary Bart Jan Spruyt
1.3.7.
In the background : prof.dr. Frits Bolkestein
2.1.1.
Ideas the Burke Foundation shares with
Edmund Burke
2.1.2.
Ideas the Burke Foundation does not
share with Burke
2.3. Carl Schmitt: anti-Semitism and Islam-bashing
2.3.1.
The Burke Foundation and Carl Schmitt
2.3.2. The
historical parallels between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia
2.3.3.
Carl Schmitt and the spirit of polarization
2.4 Between idealism and “new-realism”
2.5. Fortuyn, Burke Foundation and Wilders
2.6. The “clash of civilizations”.
2.6.1. The European history of anti-Islamism
2.6.2. Lewis, Huntington and their Dutch followers
2.7. Enlightenment fundamentalism
2.7.1. The
“liberal jihad”: shortcut-and-paste Enlightenment
2.7.2. The inconsistent criticism of Enlightenment in
Kinneging and Spruyt
2.7.3. In
Voltaire’s footsteps
2.7.4. Critical enlightenment: emancipation
2.7.5. Pragmatics as a “third enlightenment”
2.7.6.
Enlightenment and liberal religion
2.8. The core of neo-conservatism : fear of decadence
2.8.1.
“Decadence” and “nihilism”
2.8.2.
The historical tradition of anti-decadence: fascism, communism, fundamentalism
2.8.4.
Acceptance of decadence and nihilism: Post-modern morality
2.9. Good bye to social welfare
2.10 Striving for a patriarchal society
2.12 Towards a non-dogmatic criticism of fundamentalism
Dutch politics have raised
interest worldwide. The harsh tone of the anti-Islam debate is baffling the
world that was used to stereotypical Dutch tolerance. International newspaper articles
discuss the end of tolerance and the raise of right-wing populism in
Shortly before the murder on
Theo van Gogh, the Dutch national security service warned that an increasing
number of Muslims felt denigrated and stigmatised by opinion
leaders.[1]
After the murder of Van Gogh a new wave of violence hit Mosques and Islamic
schools. In the month after the murder 174 incidents took place.
New research shows growing
hostility against Muslims in the Dutch population, as well as serious
discrimination: ”On average, Moroccan youths have 30% less chance of finding a
job than their autochthonous contemporaries. In the building trade their
chances are actually three times less.”[2]
Holders of a university degree for instance, have a double rate of unemployment
if they have an immigrant background.[3]
Research by Frank Buijs also shows that many young Dutch Muslims feel severely
humiliated and discriminated by stigmatising statements about Islam. This is
not only true for young radical Muslims, but also for democratically engaged
and integrated Muslims.[4]
The 2006 Amnesty International
Yearbook is critical of the
Dutch intellectuals have played a crucial role in convincing the public
that the Islam is an intrinsically inferior religion and in promoting the
official policy that is now criticized by Amnesty International. The first
openly anti-Islamic intellectual was the VVD-politician Frits Bolkestein. In
his footsteps came professor Pim Fortuyn. A group of professors at
The Edmund Burke Foundation
started in 2000 as an initiative by the
Influencing the
political debate and putting conservative topics on the agenda was the first
goal of the think tank. ***The neoconservatives are constantly present in the
media, in all daily papers, all weekly papers, on all public television
programmes.
The second goal
was to provide a conservative curriculum for students, “building and arming” in
a “shadow university”. The third goal was to influence public organizations and
political parties directly. When the American financers withdrew from the Burke
Foundation, Burke director Bart Jan Spruyt became the personal advisor of the right-wing politician Geert
Wilders, the new anti-Islam politician who is walking in Pim Fortuyn’s
footsteps. The Burke Foundation is interesting from an international perspective.
Some foreign observers, like
Michael Ignatieff, have commented critically on the Dutch neo-conservatives,
organised in the Burke Foundation. The Burke Foundation is also closely related to the American Enterprise Association
(AEI) and has for instance organised a conference about Islam together with the
AEI.
A couple of scientific
articles have appeared about different aspects of the “Burke” political
ideology, but no thorough comprising research has been done. Especially the
recent development of the Foundation, and the cooperation with the right-wing
populist Geert Wilders, is not described yet in scientific literature. Research
about the Burke Foundation offers a couple of intriguing questions. In the
first place it is worthwhile to describe the ideas, goals and development of
this Foundation in the context of Dutch and German
conservatism (the Burke Foundation is relying heavily on the ideas of the
German conservative revolution of the 1930s) and American neo-conservatism.
In the second place the Foundation has a couple of prominent intellectual
members, three of whom are professors of the Law Faculty in
The Burkean view has much in
common with the American neo-conservative vision, but also differs from the
American perspective in some important aspects. Dutch neo-conservatism differs
significantly from American neo-conservatism in its extreme hostility against
Islam as a religion and against liberal Muslims, but also in its heavy reliance
on secular dogmatic reasoning.
One very intriguing question
about the Burke Foundation is, how it is possible that Catholic
anti-modernists (e.g. the Leiden professor and Burke founder Kinneging) and
protestant fundamentalists (e.g. former Burke director Bart Jan Spruyt) can
cooperate closely with militant secular fighters (the Leiden professors Cliteur
and Ellian) and with a politician who has announced himself as a liberal
“jihad”-fighter (Geert Wilders). My
research will, in the footsteps of John Gray’s criticism of neo-conservatism,
look for the shared concepts in the ideas of the Burkeans.
In the Burke Foundation
classical protestant fundamentalists and anti-modernists unite politically with
dogmatic secular thinkers. The result of this union can with good reasons be
viewed as “fundamentalist”. My hypothesis is, that the binding element in the
Burke Foundation can be described as the fundamentalist element.
It will have to be examined
further if “fundamentalism” is an appropriate term to be used for the views of
the Burkeans. Other terms that are connected to this question are “dogma” and
“heresy”. The Burkeans have tried to give themselves the appearance of rebels
and heretics who courageously question the society “dogma” of peace between
population groups. This is why the dialectics between dogma and heresy have to
be reviewed, as well as the relationship between populism, heresy and
fundamentalism.
Almond/Appleby/Sivan define in Strong Religion
fundamentalism as follows: “Fundamentalism […] refers to a discernible pattern of
religious militance by which self-styled ‘true believers’ attempt to arrest the
erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community,
and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors.”
This definition only applies to the religious members
of the Foundation.
In opposition to Almond/Appleby/ Sivan I want to argue
that from the study of the Burke Foundation it becomes clear that secular
militance can be considered
“fundamentalist” in spite of its lack of hope of eternal reward. On the
other hand I do not want to go as far as the Dutch minister of Justice, when he
claimed that fundamentalism is a general human attitude, found in every
individual.[5]
The
following criteria or attributes of fundamentalism that are described in
Almond/ Appleby/ Sivan Strong Religion, can, as I will demonstrate, also
be found in the philosophy and organization of the Burkeans, or in some
important aspects of their strategy and arguments:
1. Fundamentalists act strategically.
“The new leaders ransack the tradition’s past, retrieving an restoring
politically useful doctrines and practices and creating others in an effort to
construct a religiopolitical ideology capable of mobilizing disgruntled
youth.”(p. 10) “manipulating traditional teachings to serve political ends”
(p.14) see 2.3. and 2.9.
2. They impose a strict discipline on their followers (p.10 ) : The Burkean war on decadence and on nihilism. See 2.10.
3. They can be players in local, regional, and even national politics, not as result of their nostalgia […] but for their ability to adopt to modern organizational imperatives, political strategies, communication advances and economic theories.”(p. 10) see background information Burke Foundation.
4. Fundamentalists blame “the erosion
of religious belief and the irreligious worldviews and materialistic lifestyles
accompanying the growth and spread of secular science and technology.” But they
do not retreat from the secular-scientific world; they strive, rather “to
transform or conquer it.”(p.11) see 2.9.
5. Defense and
consolidation of patriarchy: anti-feminism. (p.11) see 2.12
6. Scriptual inerrancy( p.14, 96) : see 2.7.
7.
Classical protestant fundamentalism (p.14); “When describing particular movements, then,
the term ‘fundamentalists’ is accurately applied only to those Protestant
Christians of North America, who coined the term in the early twentieth
century, and their contemporary ideological heirs” (p. 16) : Burke director Spruyt is a classical
contemporary protestant fundamentalist . See 1.1.5.
Classical protestant fundamentalism
loves apocalyptical prophecies. (p. 94) So do the Burkeans, see 2.5.3.
8. Obsession
with purity, uniformity and ideas of contamination; sharp boundaries (p.17, 20, 23, 97) ; obsession
with the disintegration of the social order (p. 26) ; culture of austerity and
asceticism (p 30) ; “there is no mistaking the leitmotif: the outside is
polluted, contagious, dangerous.” “ (p. 36) see 2.6, 2.8. ; 2.10.
9. Militant
Obsession with overwhelming enemies (p.19); Moral Manichaeanism (p. 95) : see 2.3., 2.4., 2.5. and 2.8.
10. At the
same time imitation and resistance to the modern state ( p. 20) ;
fundamentalists select en embrace some aspects of modernity (p. 95) see 2.4,
2.7.
11. Enemies are perceived as powerful and potentially
overwhelming (p.19); Fear for the infiltration of the
“fifth column” (p. 26) see 2.5.; 2.7.
12. Modernity, (and especially the modern leftist
multicultural, pluralistic ideals) , is
seen as the threat (p. 37) .Fundamentalism is reactive (p. 93) see 2.9.
13. Messianism (p. 65, 96) : The Burke Foundation has
a close and positive relationship to Pim Fortuyn, who has described himself as
a religious charismatic leader in the tradition of Moses. See 2.7.
One more core
issue concerning fundamentalism can be explored, and that is the question of
Platonic essentialism in fundamentalism: the tendency to withdraw from
historical and economic circumstances. I will discuss this essentialism and the
lack of pragmatism in the theory and practice of the Burke Foundation.
By applying the theory of
fundamentalism to the Burke Foundation, I hope that a better understanding of
the political and psychological mechanism of Dutch neoconservative thinking can
be reached, as well as an understanding of present-day Western fundamentalism.
Fundamentalism is not only in the strict sense of the definition a
religious fundamentalism, but also in the wider sense a form of rigidity and
hardness against critical and open thinking.
I would like to explore the structure and the psychological elements of
fundamentalism, like
- the closed mind, the closed society
(Popper)
- the theory of resentment ( Scheler,
Nietzsche)
- the theory of the authoritarian personality (
Frenkel-Brunswik)
- the theory of projection (classical and
modern psychoanalysis)
- fear of ambiguity
- lack of self-reflection
The different groups within
historical American protestant fundamentalism united in their affront against
modernism. The “jihad” against modernism and post-modernism is also the most
important feature of the ideology of the Burke Foundation. (Post)-modern
society is described by the Burkeans as “decadent” and “nihilist”. A thorough
analysis must therefore be made of the Burkean criticism of modernity and
decadence as well as of the tradition of anti-modernism and of anti-decadence
that was very powerful under the flag of “degeneration” between 1890 and 1945.
The Burkean moral, in its
contempt for “decadence” and its plead for moral, virtues and decency, has to
be compared to the criticism of others (Margalit, Sennett, Kunneman) who’s
criticism of modern man is not- like the Burkean criticism- disconnected from
the analysis of the mechanisms of modern society and the role of capitalism.
While the Burkeans criticise private moral, they are fervent advocates of a
harsh and competitive capitalism. They cut off societal mechanisms from the
private sphere and create a double moral.
Modernity is closely related
to Enlightenment. With regard to Enlightenment, the Burkeans differ widely in
their judgement. It will be necessary to look closely into the ideological
differences between the intellectual Burke sympathizers with regard to
Enlightenment, and to decide what aspects of Enlightenment-thinking rightly can
be claimed by the neo-conservatives and what aspects of Enlightenment they
neglect. A critical study of the tradition of Enlightenment must therefore be
part of this research.
One important question related
to this is, in how far the Dutch “Enlightenment/
Western Superiority” discourse is a discourse of one-dimensional rationality
and of triumphant colonialism in the tradition of the 19th century, opposing
Barbarism versus Culture in a chauvinistic and social-Darwinist manner and
leading to a dangerous culture of contempt and humiliation of the other.
The Burkeans and their
spiritual father, Frits Bolkestein, have contributed in a quite non-scholarly
way to a severe polarization in society. Frits Bolkestein is now at
My research is part of a
scientific, political and artistic project - the Passage(n)-project -
that is connected to the
This research is continually
published, read and debated on internet. I participate actively in Internet
discussion-forums. This way my research is - as one of the internet-debaters
has stated correctly - an example of “collective enlightenment” and of living
hermeneutics (Nasr Abu Zayd).
Muslim fundamentalists are
using Internet to spread their poisonous ideas. Internet can and must be used
for critical Enlightenment. Nasr Abu Zayd says that we must fight both Muslim
fundamentalists and their mirroring “Clash-of- civilization”-thinkers with the
means of open dialogue:
“We have to be
alert and to join our efforts to fight both claims
and their consequences by all possible democratic means.” Or, like three
researchers from
I
think that this fight for freedom is necessary even without a guarantee or hope
of success. My motivation comes more from the need and pleasure in expressing
myself than from the optimism that I will be able to convince others. I am not
very much concerned with finding The Truth, I am concerned with living a good
life and this way creating an open and welcoming society, thus creating a good
life also for others.
I
am motivated by a pragmatic emancipatory interest (Habermas: emanzipatorisches
Erkenntnisinteresse) and want to connect knowledge with practical life
experience and reflection.[7]
I oppose to the metaphysical essentialism that is the philosophical base of
Burkean thinking and that considers itself as “objective”. I am more interested
in solidarity that in “objectivity”, I am dropping the distinction between
knowledge and opinion, “construed as the distinction between truth as
correspondence to reality and truth as a commendatory term for well-justified
beliefs”. For “partisans of solidarity” like me the account of the “value of
cooperative human inquiry has only an ethical base”. [8]
I am not interested in metaphysical questions. I am explicitly interested in
politics and in pragmatics, which according to Dewey and to Rorty are “clearing
the ground for democratic politics.”[9]
In the footsteps of
Rorty, Popper and (with some limitations) Habermas, my desire for objectivity
is not the desire to escape the limitations of one’s community, like the
Platonic philosopher’s, but “the desire for as much intersubjective agreement
as possible, the desire to extend the reference of ‘us’ as far as we can.”[10]
For a pragmatist, the difference between knowledge and opinion is simply “the
difference between topics on which agreement is relatively easy to get and
topics on which agreement is relatively hard to get.”[11]
I write about topics where agreement is relatively hard to get, and I work hard
to get this agreement from a group as large as possible. This stance places me
at a maximum philosophical and psychological distance to my counteragents, the
Burkeans, for whom there is nothing more dangerous and appalling than what they
call “relativism” and “postmodernism”.
”Criticism of criticism” is
according to Dewey and Hilary Putnam the core of pragmatic enlightenment.
Criticism of the Burkean criticism is thus my goal.
My work is strongly political.
My opponents are tied to political parties ( the populist right wing of the
VVD, and the right wing parties of Fortuyn and Wilders) and I am a member of a
political party (the Green Left Party) as well. Because of the highly political
context of my research I find it very difficult to use words as “objectivity”
or “truth”. I find that this could be considered as an unfair attempt from my
side to place myself on a higher level than my opponents. Of course, science should generally seek
truth, and be tied to facts as much as possible. But there are fields in
science and research, where the truth does not so much already exist, as it is
actively constructed. The Burkeans are convinced of an existing “clash of
civilizations” and claim that this clash truly exists. In opposition to this, I
say (with John Gray), that the neoconservatives themselves are creating a
world, where this clash becomes truth. Objectivity and truth can be easily
claimed, but ones opponents will never agree that one is objective anyway,
while one’s soul mates will anyway understand. So why bother with big words?
Prof. Annemarie Mol (
The issue objectivity and scientific method was recently
raised in the controversy around the WRR-report about Islam, when Afshin
Ellian, in the footsteps of Wilders, rejected the report and with it one of
authors, Nasr Abu Zayd, as fraud.
Baukje Prins, author of the important book about
minorities and integration Voorbij de onschuld (No more innocence;
2000/2004) writes about the issue of objectivity: “ I want to defend the
proposition that every scientific statement, that how ever objective, implies a
certain moral and political bias. The ivory tower of science does not exist.
Even the most neutral or ‘fundamental’ research
is connected by all kind of strings with everyday reality of interests,
values, ambitions and power relations, material and non-material hinders and
incitements. And there is nothing wrong with this bias. The critical question for science when it
comes to reality itself, is according to me [Prins] not so much : how much is
scientific knowledge prejudiced? But: which prejudice is better? What kind of
bias gives knowledge that can be useful, en which has a negative influence? The
epistemological question about ‘objective’, ‘just’ reproduction of reality
gives way for a moral-political question after the societal effects of
different reconstructions of reality. “[13]